INSTITUTIONALIZING COLONIAL EDUCATION POLICY, INSTITUTING GOVERNMENTALITY IN BRITISH COLONIAL INDIA

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the discursive and political fields within which the colonial education policy was formalized in nineteenth century India. The first three decades of the nineteenth century were marked with the battle of ideas regarding the nature and content of education. While the Anglicists argued for English as the only means of schooling in India, the Orientalists wanted English to coexist with indigenous systems of instruction. This paper explains how an education policy as a technique of governance was constituted and how the power of colonial governmentality came to be premised alongside such a technique in colonial India.

Keywords: Colonialism, Context-analysis, Development, Education, Ethnography, Policy, Governmentality, Instrumentalities.

INTRODUCTION

This paper’s principal concern is the discursive field wherein the education question was debated between 1813 and 1835 in colonial India. More specifically, it will look at T.B Macaulay’s Minute on Education (2 February 1835) but with an eye not only on the ideas/political developments in England at the time that influenced the minute but also the opposition to it within the colonial government, specifically and directly by H.H. Prinsep, another member of the Council of Education. The interest of this paper is in finding out how the education question, first articulated in the Charter Act of 1813, came to be so articulated and how within the next two decades and in the Resolution of 7 March 1835 it was answered such that education as a question “disappeared” from the discursive field around colonial governmentality after 1835 even as concerns around its institutionalization and other questions like the “woman question” (their “inferior” status in a colonial culture) were vigorously articulated and debated (Chatterjee, 1993). It is almost tautological to say that colonial histories, with various theoretic dispositions, have considered Macaulay’s Minute (1835) as a landmark of colonial policy on education (Ballhatchet, 1951; Spears, 1938). In fact it is popularly considered the actual policy on education and the Resolution of 1835 as its formal attestation.

This paper agrees with the characterization yet with the intention to re-examine both as two ends of a process that in its contentiousness points to the artifice of governance—of governance as a mentality and as conduct that produces particular intended/unintended effects or what David Scott (1995) calls “political rationalities of colonial power”. Colonial political rationality, Scott explains, “Characterizes those ways in which colonial power is organized as an activity designed to produce effects of rule” and “illuminate . . . the targets of colonial power and the field of its operation”. The paper’s interest is more in the process through which the colonial policy on education was constituted, and how in its unambiguity, in terms of statement of problem and its effect, lay the preciseness with which colonial governmentality began to operate in the everyday lives of the subject-population. Put another way, in the preciseness of policy lay the power of colonial governmentality. But this preciseness was
constructed and was not a given. It was achieved, not assumed. If the success of colonial governmentality is located in its claims to scientificism and preciseness of articulation of the problem and nature of intervention, then “a critical interrogation of the practices . . . projects” through which Europe was inserted into the lives of the colonized is almost mandatory (David Scott, 1995). This interrogation is also important for understanding how “hierarchy of ideas” is created—why certain ideas make it in the realm of the political and others don’t or are rejected; why certain ideas, and not others, came to be associated with modern governmentality. The aim, however, is to show the histories of association as well as of disassociation. In the technique of governance called policy, the paper hopes to uncover what Foucault calls “subjugated knowledges,” or “ideas that never made it” (into policy) or the nature of conflict between a set of ideas that the unambiguity of the formal policy hides effectively (Foucault, 1991). So the project of uncovering the historical struggles between ideas, with an eye on its implication for policy-making around education of the natives, will provide insights into the process through which the project of colonial governmentality came to be totalizing in its affect.

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND PROBLEMATIC OF GOVERNANCE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In 1709, with the formation of the United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies through the merger of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ companies, initially fighting with each for the monopoly of East India trade, a new framework for relations between the state and the company was erected. The Company’s activities in the East were restricted from the first unlike its regional rivals like the Dutch and the Portuguese. The latter enjoyed more state support than the Company. So the company had to tread gingerly and seek trading relations in the East where a permanent display of force was unnecessary. Under the protection of the last generation of the Moghul emperors in the Indian peninsula the company established its first trading center at Surat in 1613 and also formulated the doctrine of “peaceful trade without territorial responsibilities” (Muir, 1915). Sir Thomas Roe, James I’s ambassador to the Moghul ruler at the time said, “war and traffic are incompatible” (Muir, 1915). In the early seventeenth century, therefore, the company policy was to evade dangers of confrontation and war and the expenses implied for the positions defended thereafter by restricting its activities to areas where the Moghul influence and power could protect them. But this lasted till the end of the century for gradually the attractiveness of new trading concords diverted the company to the fringes of the empire where its influence was weak and fissiparous tendencies of vassal states was becoming evident. There was a general restlessness amongst the fringe states to break free of the now crumbling and militarily weak empire and this scenario also provided the company with new political opportunities to safeguard its economic interests.

The earlier doctrine of not mixing war with traffic gave way to such statement of purpose from the company’s servants: “the time now requires you to manage your general commerce with sword in your hand,” or “though our business is only trade and security, not conquest, which the Dutch aimed at, we dare not trade boldly nor leave great stocks . . . where we have not security of a fort” and after the annexation of Bengal, the company concluded that the days of “fenceless factories were over” (Colley, 2003). The company was now coming into its own in an unfamiliar land and asserting its economic right to be in the East and also exercising that right in whichever way it deemed possible and feasible. But this new political necessity to safeguard economic interests through flexing of the military muscle rather than diplomatic means brought with it some new responsibility that it had wanted to avoid from the beginning. The new political territories that came under direct or indirect influence of the company required administrative intervention, which in turn required extra financial consideration. Was it wise for the company to expend all its wealth accumulated here in the administration of the annexed or allegiance seeking territories? What would its profit be and would the state be accepting of a company without economic benefit to the state exchequer? The concern here was economic survival of the company in a politically fractious environment rather than about controlling or managing people or populations. It was about managing kings and pacifying subjects to become willing partners in the company’s mercantilist aspirations and endeavors. Yet the introduction of company interests in the administration of vassal territories or those acquired through annexations, despite violent oppositions from the British state time and again had set the trajectory for the introduction of a new kind of thinking about space, people, and governance in the eighteenth century.
TO GOVERN OR NOT GOVERN

For the company to govern or not govern continued to be debated between the company loyalists and servants and those in the British government who opposed political (mis)adventures of an erstwhile trading company. Here articulations and meanings of governance included deliberate interference in the political affairs of a fractured and crumbling empire with a view to its administration for the sake of company profits. The British state wanted the company to adhere to its erstwhile doctrine of peaceful trading without territorial responsibilities because it was not ready to back a company that entertained and nourished the idea of an empire in India when the footholds for such an empire to form were very weak and fraught with dangers of violent local oppositions. But the state had to also recognize the ground political realities within which the company had not only to survive but also thrive. It reluctantly recognized the political moves it had to make to exist in the region and therefore supported such moves through military help and political support. But such support was never consistent and often was accompanied by stringent legislative acts that infringed on the monopoly rights of the company and curtailed absolute powers of the servants in the region, especially those who made India their private hunting and ravaging ground and became rich through galavantism.

So Warren Hastings, the Governor-General of India in 1784, evolved a five principle system of governance in Bengal and in a way also articulated the first components of colonial governmentality in India: power cannot be divorced from responsibility without disastrous consequences, imposition of the responsibility of governance on the company servants was essential to check their greed, and Indian provinces, including Bengal, should be managed according to Indian customs not English ones (Muir, 1915). But it was his desire to develop stately relations with kingdoms whose political benevolence was necessary for the company to survive that received more attention and criticism from the directors and also from the crown. The directors saw this articulation as tantamount to meddling in local political intrigues and therefore potentially disastrous to the trading identity of the company. Their solution therefore was to recall Hastings and make him a “bad” example by impeaching him. He died in infamy as a “corrupt tyrant who dared to control the government of Bengal in the name of administering its revenues” (Muir, 1915).

Hastings’ attempt to establish, what La Mothe Le Vayer has called the art of government or the meticulous management of the economic through political means and strategies, may have scared the Crown early on for its radicalness in the fragmented colonial context, but gradually and with increasing political and military influence of the company, the art of government did not seem impossible or unfeasible (Foucault, 1991). The Crown had to come to terms with the reality that the company by 1818 had become the sole power in India, despite its legislative acts like the Act of 1786 that had discouraged an “act of entanglements with the Indian powers” (Muir, 1915). “Every prince within these limits had become a vassal bound by the treaty to submit to his government, to British supervision, to depend for his defense on the British and to have no independent dealings with any other powers” (Muir, 1915). And Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last Moghul emperor, became the company’s pensioner.

The new paramountcy of power required the new political players to rethink issues (especially how and to what end) of management and governance of people and things that exceeded in volume, density, and idiosyncrasies beyond the level of the family—the archetypical model and site for the art of government and its transference from here to the level of state activity as suggested by Le Vayer. The new political sovereignty also could not only be juridical, it could no longer be just imposition of laws on people. One obvious reason was the problem of law or what would be law in an unfamiliar territory and therefore its imposition became a secondary issue. Even if the content of law is certified and finally implemented, it required consent from those affected by them. If the law itself is unrecognized in the midst of various local customs and customary ways of justice, then what does this imply for the juridical power of the new sovereign? Therefore, the art of governance could neither be centered only on the family nor imposed through laws. If the subject of thought were people and resources, then governance meant employing a range of tactics, including law, to arrange things in a way certain ends may be achieved.

So the juridical sovereignty of the Prince was now making way for governmentality, a new mentality towards organization and control of people in relation to resources available that all modern governments/states have come to embody henceforth. In other words, the
problematic of governance enunciated by the Crown, post-paramountancy in India, identified a modern government’s future vocation and its only end—population. And it is in knowing, mapping, and redefining population that the modern government has come to be. In other words, it is the “problematic (later problem) of population” that sustains and regenerates modern governmentality. It is also interesting to note here that it is precisely in the abstractness of population, its sense as a “mass” that is indistinguishable from itself, that generates, dies, and regenerates itself periodically, and the diversities of its lived realities that governance/government discovers its vocation. It discovers its ways to be and to manufacture consent in its favor. In positing the population as an abstract category, the government also discovers the range of tactics (institutions, techniques, reflections) it can deploy to identify the specific “realities” of this population and where modern power may affect/manage/transform it. And the British Crown thus “discovered” that modern governmentality and colonization were inseparable in the context called India.

SUBJECT AND SUBJECTIFICATION

The Crown also realized yet another dimension of modern rule that is different from juridical sovereignty—subject and subjectification. The Prince used law (its coercive power) to demand the allegiance of his subjects and to keep his principalities under his control. He feared foreign aggression but seemed safe in his own domain. The Prince chose whether he wanted to manufacture the consent and goodwill of his subjects towards him. It was neither a political necessity nor a rule of rule. The dichotomy of rule was obvious in the externality of the Prince to his subjects. He stood over and above them as their benefactor but more as their ruler. Even when the political reality was obvious, the Crown, unlike the Prince, wanted to deny and shy away from the responsibility of rule. It was very aware of its own externality and its foreignness in terms of its purpose and geographical location and of the possible resistance this may generate in the people. Therefore, it neither used the juridical language of control nor attempted coercion of people into becoming the subjects of an empire. Instead it called the new India, a trust in the hands of the Crown that would only be administered for the benefit of the people of India. It attempted not to rule in the juridical sense but through peoples’ consent. If the Prince ruled his subjects through imposition of law, the British Crown could rule only through the subjectification of the people that required a range of tactics beyond law. The people now had to learn to give consent to their rule and for that the Crown had to teach them, make them subjects of a new culture of governance, a project that the Prince did not have to undertake. The Crown therefore gave form to the idea of the state as practice in the colonial context and also identified, in the use of caution and placation of the population, limits to its own ambition—of knowing completely the conduct of those it aims to change, guide, or affect. Yet at the same time, the Crown was also beginning to be engaged in the process of knowledge production about the microphysical aspects of peoples’ lives such that the art of governance that would follow would be in the “name of truth” (Barry, Osborne, and Rose, 1996). Therefore “government in the name of truth” is the Crown’s intention and proposed project in the newly colonized context. How to govern required new reflections and education since the early nineteenth century began to emerge as a tactic to influence the subjectivities of the ruled. Its articulations and definitions had begun from the time of Warren Hastings, but tentatively, and seemed then more an affirmation of the existing systems of instruction. But gradually meanings of education became specific and new in both its content and end. In other words, if Hastings had repudiated the idea of making India English in language, customs, and judicature as one of his principles of governance in 1772, William Bentick, in sharp contrast, put the political seal of approval on Macaulay’s art of governance through English and only English in 1835.

THE BATTLE OF IDEAS: MACAULAY VERSUS PRINSEP

Lord Bentick’s 7 March 1835 resolution that “His Lordship in Council is of the opinion that the great object of the government ought to be the promotion of European literature and science amongst the natives of India; and that all the funds appropriated for the purpose of education should be employed on English education alone” reflects nothing of the contentious back and forth between the two government officials regarding the question of education in India soon after the publication of Macaulay’s minute on education (Woodrow, 1862). The 11-page minute may be summarized thus:

“I think it is clear that we are not fettered by the Act of Parliament of 1813, that we are not fettered by an pledge expressed or implied, that we are free to employ
our funds as we choose, that we ought to employ them in teaching what is best worth knowing, that English is better worth knowing than Sanskrit or Arabic, that neither as the languages of law nor as the language of religion have Sanskrit or Arabic any claim to our encouragement, that it is possible to make the natives of this country thoroughly good English scholars, and that to this end our efforts ought to be directed.

"...we must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern—a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of sciences borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population.

...I would strike at the root of the bad system, which has hitherto been fostered by us. I would at once stop the printing of Arabic and Sanskrit books. I would abolish the madrassa and the Sanskrit college at Calcutta...if we retain the Sanskrit college at Benares and the Mahometan college at Delhi we do enough. ...for the Eastern languages. If the Benares and Delhi colleges were to be retained, I would at least recommend that no stipends be given to any students... people should be left to make their own choices between rival systems if education without being bribed by us to learn what they have no desire to know. I believe that the present system tends not to accelerate the progress of truth but to delay the natural death of expiring errors" (Sharp, 1920).

The Legal Point: W. H. Prinsep, member Council on Education, in his concern about Macaulay's insistence on funding only English education of the natives, provides a rather structured and rigorous counter-argument to each "fact" that Macaulay presents to make his case. For example, Macaulay argues that the "revival of native literature can be best effected by abolishing all institutions for teaching the literature that then existed and that had existed for ages before and by communicating instruction only in English" (Sharp, 1920). To this rather circuitous way of arguing that "native" literature too is in need of "modernization" and that critical to that process of modernization is mediation of its meanings through English, Prinsep has a rather contextual and legal response. To him Macaulay’s contention contravenes a legal Act of the Act 53 Geo III, which intended to encourage and promote the native literature of India. To Prinsep it is clear that the Act's emphasis on the "revival and promotion of literature and the encouragement of the learned natives," did not mean to "refer to any other literature than native literature not to any other learned natives than such as were eminent by their proficiency in that literature" (Sharp, 1920). He also reiterates that this was what the Act intended then and should not be “forced out of their natural construction” to mean anything different. In other words, he takes objection to Macaulay's interpretation of "revival and promotion of literature" as English literature and "encouragement of learned natives" as encouraging the natives to learn English and translate "native" literature into English.

The Cultural Point (English versus Native Languages): Prinsep believes that the real intention of Macaulay's minute was to discourage teaching of Arabic and Sanskrit by natives to natives. For Macaulay the "teaching of Arabic and Sanskrit was not consulting the intellectual taste of the natives but forcing on them the mock learning which they nauseate" (Sharp, 1920). To him, "this is proved by the fact that we pay our Arabic and Sanskrit students while those who learn English pay us... we cannot find in our vast empire a single student who will let us teach him those dialects unless we will pay him" (Sharp, 1920). Macaulay's assertions are supported by the report on the Calcutta madrasa where in December 1833, 77 Arabic students in the foundation were receiving in the aggregate above Rs 500 per month, while the English master received Rs103 from students who wanted to learn English (Sharp, 1920, p.123). Yet Prinsep still sees no ground to believe that the "great body of Mooslims" did not want to venerate their own language and literature or that the Hindus as a body were not partial to Sanskrit. And therefore there is, to him, no ground to argue like Macaulay does, that natives abhor their own languages and would rather read/study English, a language that Macaulay calls the "gateway to science and reason" (Sharp, 1920).

Prinsep by critiquing the subjective nature of the minute is in fact critiquing the contingent nature of governmentality by the same token. Instead of exploring in detail and rigorously the question of education in conjunction with the dilemmas of the youth within political transience, the minute, for Prinsep, is Macaulay's eulogy to English within a lingual and cultural diversity and with varying commitments to this
diversity. In fact Prinsep here wants to refocus on the crux of the argument of the minute—that it is “by encouraging the study of native literature... opposition to the study of English and of true science” is promoted (Sharp, 1920). Macaulay is convinced and tries to convince others that only in violently ejecting the existing notions of erudition and erudite learning and literature that one can finally remove the opposition to English and Science. To Prinsep this line of argument first assumes that the scholars of Sanskrit and Persian are necessarily opposed to the new or to English in this instance and second, reconciliation between the two is impossibility (Sharp, 1920). This contention, however, directly contravenes another, that “all the world is anxiously seeking the new and attaches no value to the old” (Sharp, 1920).

Prinsep, therefore, is concerned with the contending nature of the two arguments—if the “native” population is not attached to its own systems of learning, as per Macaulay, and is only seeking the new, then how can they also be the principal hindrance to the introduction of English language and literature? Prinsep, on the other hand, accounts not only for the discontent amongst particular sections of the society and between communities regarding English, but also recognizes, to support his political views on education, an extensive and indigenous system of learning that has its own complex histories of origin and continuance that can be understood thus through time and through series of research initiatives.

**Converging Arguments?:** Yet in proposing that “true knowledge” is but an engrafting of English over that knowledge held in esteem by the natives gradually so that both can be subject of admiration in their reconciliation, Prinsep may diverge only marginally from Macaulay. Macaulay may be promoting a violent or rather sudden replacement of existing knowledge by English, yet Prinsep is only delaying such a process by making the transition to English slow and an engrained experience. In other words, the violence does not derive its effect from the suddenness of the transition, for it is not also mitigated in its slowness, as Prinsep would like us to believe. Through the course of his critique against Macaulay, Prinsep slowly begins to agree with Macaulay and never more so than regarding the issue of expenditure upon printing and translating of native literature. Macaulay argues that translations from Arabic and Sanskrit sponsored by the Committee on instruction did not sell is proof enough of the natives’ distaste for their own literature. Instead of directly engaging with this rationale to show that native literature was not worth either the attention of the government nor of the natives themselves, Prinsep, instead, agrees with the contention. He says, “I fear it must be admitted that very considerable sums have been thrown away upon works which have yielded no fruit. The translations have been the most expensive and least profitable of these works, for they have been executed at very enormous rates of charge and in a style for the most part not popular and taking” (Sharp, 1920). He also agrees and asserts that only that literature ought to be revived that would pay and what does pay need not be funded through government but left to the logic of the market or forces of demand and supply. However, Prinsep does make an important observation that just because printing and translation has not been profitable for the Committee on Instruction and for the colonial government, one cannot speculate that this is due to local nausea for their knowledge. Instead one could speculate on the ways in which the translations have been conducted and the prices at which books about what is known orally or located in the learned men and women of the community are being sold. To Prinsep this may account for “their (books) not being taken off our hands” (Sharp, 1920). On the other hand, the reason for why English books have been popular has to do private sponsorship, growing number of Christian population interested in these texts, and consistent government support to even these private efforts.

Post-dissection of each idea and its consistency with each other in Macaulay’s minute, Prinsep finally makes his own appeal. He admits to the importance and need to “endeavor to carry the people with us in all we seek to do for their improvement...” and to consider all necessary means of doing so rather than submit to grand propositions of the abolition of the Madrasa and the Sanskrit college at Calcutta and the alteration of the character of all other institutions supported or assisted from the public funds. Prinsep sees great harm in such propositions because if local institutions of learning are demolished through cessation of funding to them, the government would no longer have the pulse of the local youth. Prinsep also argues against the cessation of funding because, for him, there is no legal basis to this. If the local institutions thrived under private endowment, one established separately from the government and
even before the issue of state funding for education of youth in colonies was considered, then to abolish it needs deeper and more extensive discussions between the members of the Committee on Instruction and the learned members of the institutions rather than the whim of an individual. Prinsep, however, is more concerned about the social consequences of a hurried and non-discursive mode of instituting change locally, whether it is in the form of abolition of the Madrasa or the engrafting of English on local forms of learning. He is concerned about the possibility of alienating particular communities like the Muslims, who, he thinks, “are more jealous of innovation upon their habits than the Hindus ever were” (Sharp, 1920). Therefore, to Prinsep, it is of critical importance that the government suspends judgment on the best way to educate the people of India till the government hears all of the opposing arguments to the minute presented by Macaulay. He doesn’t think that engrafting English and degrafting of the local learning processes without adequate problematizing of the issue of education and of the “unfamiliar” was at all in the interest of a government attempting to extend its domain of influence and control.

**Thoughtful Governance is Safe Governance?:** Prinsep's interjections to Macaulay's minute are important not only for their reflections on education as a modern technique of governance but also marks the disagreements and ruptures that characterize the understanding of education as a technique of governance in a colonial context. Prinsep seems to be arguing that population, as the object of modern governance and of political decision-making, requires the imperative of discussion. He is pre-empting an opposing reaction to Macaulay’s minute for its suddenness in replacing the patronized local systems of education by English literature and its ill consideration of the political and governance motives for the patronage to have existed before. And the preemption, for Prinsep, is based on the Minute’s claim to know the “hearts and minds of the Indians” and their favoring of English to their own indigenous systems of knowledge without even considering ethnographies of the state of education in Northern India by a council member like Adam, contemporary of both Prinsep and Macaulay. Prinsep attempts to show how Macaulay fails to contribute to the modern governance in his hastiness to impose an idea and system; he spares no time or thought to the need to deliberate or problematize education in the colonial context. To Prinsep the Minute is therefore a good example of how both the object of governance and the project of modernity are undermined.

**Liberal Reflections:** The debate between Macaulay and Prinsep may also be perceived as a debate between the classical and Anglo-Scottish school of liberal thought in Europe, especially as even these streams of political rationalities struggled to accommodate the truths about imperialism and its rapacious nature. While Macaulay seems to represent classical liberalism or early liberalism in his need to protect British economic interests in the sub-continent while exercising an unlimited exercise of political sovereignty, Prinsep represents its critique. Prinsep, in calling Macaulay’s resolution as a “hostile declaration against the literature of the country inconsistent with the past and with recent professions of the government . . .” is implying a criticism of the characteristic form of government in the early modern period, persisting in the minds of particular political players like Macaulay even in the nineteenth century, which Foucault describes as the “police state” associated with *raison d’état* (Burchell, 1996). The assumption of *raison d’état* was that the state was able to have an adequate and detailed knowledge of what had to be governed and on the basis of which it could act to direct and shape reality in accordance with its, the state’s own interests like increasing its wealth and military strength either against other states (Burchell, 1996). Yet this is precisely liberalism’s critique of the state and its claim to knowledge of the governable social terrain that Prinsep’s comments on Macaulay’s minute foregrounded. He is echoing what Foucault has called the “decisive point of liberalism’s critique of the state and its reason . . . or of the state’s ability to know perfectly and in all details the reality to be governed and also its capacity to shape this reality at will on the basis of such knowledge (Burchell, 1996). But it is important to note here that Prinsep, in echoing the Anglo-Scottish liberal thought of setting limits to the state’s capacity to know and act by situating it in relation to the reality of the market and the commercial exchanges and of regarding the social space as quasi-natural domains with their own intrinsic dynamic and forms of self-regulation, is specifically concerned with the limits of intervention by a colonial government in matters of an “unfamiliar” yet superficially known social. He is concerned that without a detailed knowledge of the social, it is politically and economically deleterious of a formative colonial
administration to attempt or be confident of altering the same as per the familiar. He is concerned therefore with Macaulay’s lack of political sagacity in suggesting a social engineering in the colony that is based primarily on the arrogance rather than research database of knowledge or discussion on facets of policy. So Prinsep, in the colonial context, is not questioning the state’s ability to know but rather the claim to knowledge without operable methodologies to create such knowledge on the basis of which political decisions may be made. Prinsep is therefore requesting that rules of liberalism are to be accommodated differently in the colonial context; that the state actually must know about the unfamiliar before it makes a claim to understanding it and also to change it and that knowing the unfamiliar is critical to its ability to govern and to rationalize its practices. And for this reason, Prinsep wants a more reflected way of thinking not only about Macaulay’s Minute amongst the colonial administrators but also by the government as a whole vis-à-vis the colony.

Prinsep and Macaulay debate on the issue of education of the people of India also foregrounds the debate within liberalism in its colonial setting—of the kind of state or governance necessitated here. Macaulay was convinced of the importance of inserting a paternal directive to the colonial subjects of the necessity of their own transformation through an English education. He was insisting thereby a paternal state in the colonial setting that not only claimed to know about its subjects but also the techniques of their subjectification and transformation. Prinsep, however, was less convinced of this “new state,” and in its ability to know fully about who and what it wanted to transform for its own sake. Instead he wanted a continuation of the laissez faire character of the governance even in its colonial setting rather than of attempting an effective project of social engineering amongst a population it was encountering in its complete complexity. Prinsep’s suggestion is important not for its similarity with the liberal thought of setting limits to state sovereignty and its arrogance of knowing everything about the social, but for his own confusion and trepidation about replicating a particular kind of governance in an unfamiliar setting, especially when this unfamiliar was experiencing an intrusion in its ways of life and living that was potentially disrupting and rapacious. The liberal knowledge that society comprises of free individuals making individual choices about their social and economic well being is put to test in a colonial setting. The knowledge is also critiqued by the very nature of the empire—colonizing “new” populations and lands for the singular purpose of building its economic and military might versus other empires.

The fundamental principles of liberalism as “committed to securing individual liberty and human dignity through a political cast that typically involves democratic and representative institutions, the guaranty of individual rights of property, and freedom of expression, association, and conscience . . .” however were severely tested in the context of colonization of people and denying them basic human rights (Elliott, 1966). Yet the test did not result in the death of liberalism but provided the ground rather for its legitimation as a particular political philosophy that, however, could be universally replicated through the operationalization of particular techniques of subjectification. The coercive and paternalistic state in the colonial context was thus justified even as its laissez faire character was insisted on in the western context. Macaulay was thus convinced but Prinsep was trepiditious of the consequences of such an assertive and intrusive state and its techniques of transforming the colonial setting to assist in this project.

But the seeming divergence between Macaulay and Prinsep’s thoughts on the operationalization of liberal ideas in the governance of an “alien race” stems not from a different understanding of liberalism and its influence on the nature of governance but of the preparedness of the object domain (the social) to be governed through particular techniques. There is no disagreement between the two regarding the social as the problem-space of the government and that this space is open-ended space of real politico-technical invention of a governmental constructivism. Yet both are also simultaneously debating or attempting to fix an answer to the question of how political sovereignty must be exercised in a new environment where the object-domain is not constitutive of familiar forms of self-government or patterns of sociability or what relationship must political sovereignty establish with the quasi-natural reality over which it must preside but with which it may not do what it likes (again, not because of its internal dynamism but because of lack of knowledge of what may this dynamism be). The debate between the two is also about techniques of a liberal art of government in a colonial environment; what techniques, procedures, regulations and laws would become suitable
for the transformation of this reality in accordance with particular goals of increasing production and wealth. Both Adam and Prinsep, even in their opposition to promoting English education of the natives due to considerations of appropriateness of time and lack of enough discussion on the subject, in fact became its supporters. William Bentick’s official Resolution of 1835 made promotion of English education as colonial government’s principal aim, not despite but because of its contentious upbringing in the colonial context.

CONCLUSION: THE RESOLUTION OF THE EDUCATION QUESTION
So in the post-1835 colonial scenario the question of education was no longer a question but answered in favor of English and its teaching in schools and universities. The resolution of the education question also resolved the problematic of governmentality that plagued the Company since the eighteenth century. With clarity on the meaning of education emerged the clarity on how best to govern in the colonial space without fear or favor. Once English was marked as an instrument of self-governability and self-improvement and indigenous elite created to refer to and participate in the making and dissemination of such a contention, education’s importance could no longer be a question or broker debates around its possible answers. The Resolution of 1835 then did two things: one, it closed the debate, at the level of the government, on the meaning and importance of education in the colonial context, and two, it marked the emergence of governmentality, especially as a discursive process, but a process central to the art of governance. Post-1835 then education was not debated as it was till 1835. As a question posed in a particular way in 1813 and then answered accordingly in 1835, education ceased to be a matter of debate for the colonial government in the late nineteenth century. What education does and can do (self-improvement) continued to be reasserted in various ways after 1835, especially in the form of more institutions of English education (schools and universities), but with the understanding that education meant western education taught in English. Now the issue for debate within the colonial government was additional English schools and changes in the English curriculum or even its formalization and not whether English was appropriate to teach. This was also because the same government that authored the resolution of the education question in 1835 was also one to author yet another question—the woman’s question. This shifted attention to another problematic of governmentality and to another process for its resolution; one that would take a different trajectory and because of different reasons.

REFERENCES


